Attempts to build a liberal peace and a concurrent neoliberal state in Kosovo have not managed to produce a sustainable and emancipatory peace. Instead, they have produced a local and negative hybrid peace that has been co-opted by the dynamics of local state formation and state contestation. These dynamics have overshadowed a meaningful transition from ethnic hostility to sustainable peace, which in Kosovo's context encompasses pluralism, security, law, rights, and liberal institutions, as well as the recognition of contextual identity and historical political struggles for justice. This article examines the emergence of a negative hybrid peace and explores the prospects for a more emancipatory form of peace based on local pro-peace infrastructure which avoids the pitfalls of liberal peace in practice.
. Nevertheless, certain local civil society groups in Kosovo provide some evidence of peace formation aimed at constructing locally legitimate peace frameworks, which are also for the most part connected to international liberal agendas. The negative hybrid peace that has emerged raises contentious issues between insider and outsider actors regarding the nature of peace, justice, reconciliation, state sovereignty, governance, security, and economy in Kosovo. These divisions are rooted in the legacies of the past, but also are products of failed statebuilding in Kosovo. The state has failed to meet the diverse claims of its populations, and has instead been framed according to a mixture of external blueprints and local elite preferences.
This article explores the space for a positive hybrid peace in Kosovo. Positive hybrid peace is defined as "complementary practices related to democracy, self-determination, agency, autonomy, solidarity, human rights and needs, and a rule of law, with customary social support networks, customary forms of governance and political order" (Richmond 2011, 19) . We combine critical qualitative and descriptive analysis with field research in Kosovo to explore the performance and impact of liberal peacebuilding as well as explore what an emancipatory peace would look like in Kosovo. We depart from existing liberal peace accounts by suggesting peace enablement rather than external intervention, and greater attention to local agencies for peace formation than empowerment of ethno-nationalist peacebreakers. We argue that the failure of liberal peace to produce a positive peace in Kosovo should not be seen as the end of the critique, rather a necessary departure for exploring alternatives to the emergent negative peace in the country. To make the case for an emancipatory peace, it is important to explore social conditions shaping peace in Kosovo and critically engage with the potentials for emancipatory transformation.
We argue that an "ideal state" (Trindade 2008) for Kosovo would require a new locally-formed and externally-enabled peace arrangement, which is not rooted on the basis of ethno-nationalism but on plural identities, an inclusive type of statehood, institutions, and services, as well as a formal peace with Serbia. It would also require significant security and material support from the UN, donors, and the EU. Broad self-governance for minorities would be necessary, as well as a governance model that emancipates and empowers citizens while alleviating social inequalities. While some of these aspects were advocated by liberal peace proponents, the process and means for achieving them were unsuccessful. We depart from existing liberal peace frameworks as we do not advocate renewing externally imposed liberal peace frameworks, but rather locally generated emancipatory policies aimed at producing reconciliation, which engages as necessary with external liberal actors. In what follows, we outline the negative hybrid peace frameworks that have emerged during the local encounter with liberal peace missions in Kosovo, and then explore whether it provided the potential for a positive hybrid and therefore more emancipatory peace.
An Emancipatory Peace after Liberal Peace?
In the past two decades, liberal peace has guided scholarly debates and policy practices on post-conflict societies. Liberal peace entails addressing root causes of conflict through implanting democratic governance and economic liberalism through a broad range of interventionary practices (Paris 2010; Doyle 2012) . The focus of liberal peacebuilding on constructing and reconstructing state institutions, writing laws and regulations, and setting enforcement mechanisms has contributed to the creation of negative hybrid forms of peace, which are a step forward from the past situation, but insufficient for a sustainable peace (see Tadjbakhsh 2011) . In most societies, liberal peace frameworks have unintentionally produced an impasse for democracy and sustainable peace. Negative and positive gradations of hybrid peace are being used as a way to capture this combination of positive and negative political processes that combine elements of democratic practice, self-governance, solidarity and justice with more negative dynamics of external imposition and within-group ethnonationalist domination (see Richmond 2005, 198; Mac Ginty 2014) . Jarstad and Belloni define hybridity as "a condition where liberal and illiberal norms, institutions, and actors coexist, interact, and even clash" (2012, 1).
In many cases, new peace processes and settlements are captured by ethno-nationalist exclusionary dynamics that do not foster reconciliation, justice, and emancipation. Peace disrupts existing power relations so it should not be surprising that power attempts to capture peace processes. Since the early 1990s, this has generally resulted in capitalist states that pay lip-service to human rights and democratic norms and processes. Seen from a normative perspective, one of the most harmful dimensions of negative hybrid peace is exclusionary ethnic politics. Although high-level peace agreements might hold, peaceful communities cannot emerge through a social contract imposed from outside and through elite pseudorepresentative politics (Jarstad and Sisk 2008) . In such cases, power is encapsulated by a small elite, which draws on both majority and minority communities that capture moderate political voices and blocks cross-community cleavages. Such authoritarian dynamics are a product of international community's reliance on and exploitation of a small political elite who are capable of maintaining domestic stability in exchange for securing external legitimacy at the expense of ignoring other pro-peace social groups.
Universalist notions of peace have proven not to be fit for purpose in various particularistic contexts (Mac Ginty 2014) . Prioritizing security and top-down statebuilding has overshadowed moral necessity for engagement, representation and autonomy in postconflict societies. Peace embedded in ethnic politics has created minorities within minorities, and endless cycles of domination and revenge. Neoliberal statist frameworks have impeded reconciliation and emancipation. The urge for a new social contract is critical in many postconflict societies. The negative hybrid peace that has emerged in conflict-affected societies should not be seen as an acceptable state of affairs or end result of failed statebuilding and peacebuilding. The role of critical approaches should be to move beyond negative hybrid peace, otherwise accepting negative hybrid peace as the end result of a peace process would mean accepting structural inequalities and latent tensions that pertain to conflict-affected societies. In fact, the very idea of hybrid peace has been to describe the transitory stage towards a more positive, durable peace if social preferences can be recognized and mediated and legitimate authority, plus a capacity to intervene, constructed accordingly. One potential avenue is to search for emancipatory forms of peace inside and outside the state framework and norms of liberal peace. In this context, an emancipatory peace should be understood as a transformative process after negative hybrid peace, whereby a positive hybrid peace emerges and overcomes structural and agential impediments to create space for local emancipation, justice, and equality and co-existence with regional and international structures. Such postliberal forms of peace (see Richmond 2011; Richmond 2014) radically displace the potential for peace formation from external interveners to internal peace formers.
The concept of an emancipatory peace is linked to long standing debates in political theory and philosophy about the nature of emancipation and progress, as well as the role of progress in leading to the good life for society, often in democracies (Richmond 2008) .
Progress is often associated with liberalism and modernity, and has been subject to extensive criticism (Giddens 1991) . From a social and liberal perspective, since the 19 th Century progress represented security and the improvement of rights pertaining to life, work, and welfare. More recently, progress has become connected with legal equality, sustainable economies and ecologies, an approximation of material equality, networks and mobility (Balibar 2002) . This latter perspective, offering a version of emancipation for the contemporary era, provides a different understanding of the desired peace, where progress is related to contingent, and non-determinist transformation (see Susen 2015, 156 ).
Emancipatory peace is not a mere reproduction of liberal peace: rather it signifies localized efforts for forming peace by peaceful means, autonomous from elite predation and external intervention, but able to draw upon external support where necessary to prevent conflict actors from establishing blockages to peace, for security, resources, knowledge, and accountability. It enables citizens to improve their rights, material conditions, access to public services, security, and maintain identity where necessary. This represents a post-liberal form of peace, which implies that locally legitimate authorities and peace enablers would work with external forces against obstacles to peace, whether structural or political, in postcolonial, pluriversal, empathetic and emancipatory terms.
While classical progressivists believe in predictable patterns of historical and social progression (Locke 1988 (Locke [1689 ), the idea of emancipatory peace indicates a less predetermined or vanguardist progressivism, which nevertheless can take place if certain enabling local and international conditions exist. It requires an updated understanding of emancipation and social justice, as well as the local, state, regional, and international, transversal and transnational actors or networks that might facilitate it. In this context, the notion of emancipation is deeply rooted in local legitimacy and bottom-up solutions, as well as in the role of the state, regional organisation, and international law and institutions, at least in modern history. Emancipatory peace entails a pluraliversal -meaning for all involved parties -conception of peace across global scales and networks, designed locally and contextually to deal with legal, material, political and social inequalities and obstacles. Unlike liberal peace, emancipatory peace requires a more critical, yet pluralist citizenry that would overcome local ethno-nationalist identity, and power-ridden authoritarian elites, patriarchy, and social discrimination, and who would promote local and bottom-up alternatives to governance that are neither harmful nor suppressive to any social group.
While liberal peace has discursively supported progressive processes through institutionalisation and civil society building, concerns with stability have accommodated ethno-nationalist groups and ignored other local potentials for peace. Normative frameworks of liberal peace are co-opted by neo-liberal statebuilding and local authoritarian tendencies.
Thus we need to go beyond these entrapments and focus on the everyday, people-centred approaches to peacebuilding. Rethinking the role of people in society and enabling their agency is crucial as the space for change exists more among dynamic subaltern agencies than through entrenched formal state structures: international engagement offers support but only if there is political will. As Linklater maintains, this is important "in shaping critical political cultures which are sensitive to the varieties of exclusion and open to progressive development" (1997, 334) . He calls for "the enlargement of citizenship to embrace social and economic rights' through recognizing difference," and "modified to take account of the particular needs and interests of subaltern groups" (Linklater 1997, 335-336) . Emancipatory peace would be more likely to produce results if it is settled on a mobile, post-Westphalian notion of citizenship, recognizing that citizens may have multiple loyalties and identities while remaining committed to the joint political and civic obligations of the political community, thus bypassing sovereignty entrapments.
Emancipatory peace rests on the conviction that local critical agency can drive progress and freedom, which are mutually constitutive and have the potential to reconstitute each other (see Brink 2013) . Local emancipation requires equal opportunity for all identity groups to determine their own lives within the contours of contemporary political communities. As Rorty claims, progress entails expanding the "sense of solidarity" and to reach out to the "marginalized people -people whom we still instinctively think of as 'they' rather than 'us'" (1989, 196) . Emancipatory peace would offer "freedom from unjustifiable forms of exclusion" (Shapcott 2011, 86) . As Booth states, "emancipation, not power or order, produces true security" (1991, 319) . In our understanding, emancipatory peace requires postexclusionary politics, which are more sensitive to local communitarian needs than predetermined ethnic politics, but can be scaled up into pluralistic institutions, law, constitutions, international organisations and networks in a way that difference does not produce untenable contradictions for the ensuing systems of governance.
Hence, "a more locally determined balance between rights and needs may produce a hybrid form of peace in its own right" (Richmond 2015, 59) . The fit between the local and the international is not homogenous, but instead agonistic and constantly pushing for mutual improvements. It requires ending social and economic inequality and not reproducing material subordination through neoliberal economic reforms, nor maintaining through the existing states-system long-standing injustices. Booth states that, "liberty is also the central value of emancipation, but emancipation implies an egalitarian concept of liberty" (1991, (321) (322) . Accordingly, peaceful and non-violent pathways in post-conflict societies require the formation of "dialogic communities." According to Linklater, their primary role is to "transcend unjust exclusion," which has local, state, and global dynamics (1998, 50 ). This dialogical process should result in achieving everyday "reflective equilibriums," which according to Rawls entail temporary adjustment of principles and considered judgments (1971, 18) . In this sense, affiliated notions with liberal peace, such as social contract, rights, civility, and security need to be decolonized, and instead explore them in their contextual sense, not only taken for granted as universal blueprints.
Thus far, liberal peacebuilding has failed to create dialogical communities because it has focused on existing power-structures rather than social potential, and so has invested extensively in "undeliberative" institutions and elitist civil society groups. (1998, 10) . While critical theory within international relations is widely criticized for being too abstract, critical accounts of peacebuilding are deeply rooted in empirical research and close observation of discourse and practices. Next, we will explore further some of the claims about negative hybrid peace and the potential for emancipatory peace in Kosovo. The protracted and extensive international intervention in
Kosovo to establish a liberal peace, and the emergence of a negative hybrid peace, make it an illustrative case which deserves detailed attention.
Negative Hybrid Peace in Kosovo
The liberal The democratization and governance process in Kosovo has evolved in unintentional and unexpected directions. The compromise strategy of ethnic power-sharing promoted elitist representation and thus rendered citizen participation peripheral. Agenda setting was a topdown process that did not take popular, pro-peace opinion into consideration but aimed at maintaining stability through ethno-nationalist appeals: the fewer diverse claims involved, the easier it was to control the situation. For example, UNMIK proactively discouraged a referendum as a form of democratic deliberation, it discouraged participatory democracy and avoided public consultation for major political decisions or law-making processes during the transition. These illiberal practices of liberal peace were transmitted to the newly established local law enforcement institutions, which continued in the similar trajectory, but added a clanbased culture of governance hidden behind the appearance of a modern state (Anderson 2010 with a handful local power-holders and implemented its agenda through them (Tansey 2009 ).
This has inevitably encouraged authoritarian practices within political parties and made external legitimacy more important than local legitimacy. This complex entanglement of power and legitimacy reduces opportunities for positive social change, increases nepotism and patronage relations, and suppresses any critical voice that seeks to challenge this figuration of power (Forum 2015 (Forum 2011 . Liberal peace tolerated these power relations in exchange for securing the compliance and stability of these local power-holders, following its widespread tendency to favour power-sharing and thereby support authoritarian and predatory capitalism and governance in tandem (Phillips, 2012) . The power-sharing nature of politics in Kosovo contributed to "power-holding," which conveniently served international actors who wanted strong and predictable local leadership to enforce their agenda, and unintentionally enabled local actors to preserve power. Ultimately, recycling the same political elite narrowed the space for progress within institutional politics in Kosovo, and ignoring grassroots peace infrastructure reduced the scope for bottom-up peace formation.
One of the major areas of liberal peace in Kosovo has been the transformation of ethnic relations. While there have been constant attempts to provide incentives for ethnic communities to change their hostile relations, most efforts focused on working at the institutional level and with dominant ethnic leaders (King and Mason 2006) . Over the years, ethnic crimes and confrontation decreased, but the overall hostile cross-community perceptions remain. Rooted in ethnic politics, minority representation mechanisms have played a limited role in peacebuilding, and served mainly as institutional battlefields for advancing ethnic agendas, benefiting materially from donations, generating in-group political support, and sustaining their political power and status (Visoka and Beha 2011) . Despite the available transitional justice mechanisms, both UNMIK and local elites were reluctant to address human rights abuses and war crimes, which occurred during and after the war (OSCE 2010, 6 In response to the lack of critical citizenry and its suppression by donor-oriented civil society groups in addition to the politics of liberal peacebuilders, critical civil society groups gradually started to emerge, who defied the imposition of liberal peace. Other groups also operated in the grey zones, utilizing donor funding while building a repertoire of critical activism and critical pedagogy towards authorities. For example, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Movement for Self-Determination) was, for several years, the leading populist movement operating outside the liberal peace space in Kosovo given its commitment to criticising and defying the imposed peace in Kosovo as well as the misconduct of local institutions. It demanded broader participatory democracy and social justice, defied the neo-liberal economic system, struggled for people's right to self-determination, and rejected the multi-ethnicity project in Kosovo (Kurti 2011) . While the movement partially represented a new emancipatory politics in Kosovo, their exclusionary practices and nationalist discourse did not attract great internal and external support. Vetëvendosje's conception of peace is not based upon the grounds of empathy, tolerance, concession, and autonomy, but on majoritarian power, identity domination, and a statist/realist conception of freedom, rights, justice, and peace. On the positive side, they offered a vision of social emancipation, fair justice, and effective governance and the possibility of escaping the dependency on international governance, but one that is heavily constrained by self-determination and nationalist claims.
Beyond the institutional framework of peacebuilding and local resistance, there is some evidence of local peacebuilding led by community-based civil society groups. The government agenda in Kosovo has not prioritized local peacebuilding, and together with the international community, focused rather on stability, power consolidation, and regional peace.
Ethnic politics can be antagonistic for reconciliation, so these local civil society groups often seek to distance themselves from such aspects and work on resolving everyday socioeconomic challenges. These groups have utilized local knowledge, capacity, and legitimacy to modify externally set normative frameworks with the sole purpose of addressing ethnic distrust and structural violence, overcoming the past, and reducing horizontal inequalities.
These local peacebuilding initiatives have the potential to develop positive local agency, overcome the negative agency of local resistance groups, and overcome the flaws and limitations of top-down, institutional, and power-driven peace in Kosovo.
Liberal peace missions in Kosovo also devoted considerable attention to the rule of law and justice sector. The presence of multiple sources of applicable law, and the presence of local and international judges, prosecutors, and police officers did not create an effective rule of law in Kosovo (King and Mason 2006) . In response to the limited role of international transitional justice in Kosovo, a number of local and regional civil society initiatives have emerged which seek to mobilise bottom-up groups to search and document past human rights abuses, engage with the victims on all sides of the conflict, and seek recognition and support for victims of past suffering beyond ethno-nationalist politics (Visoka 2016b) . However, sceptics fear that these initiatives are embedded in the current global transitional justice ideology, which seeks more political stability, compensation for international failures than meaningful, localized, and situational forms of dealing with the past and bringing justice and recognition to the victims (Di Lellio and McCurn 2013).
Overall, the liberal peace missions in Kosovo have not managed to produce a sustainable and emancipatory social contract, where the people's needs and will are at the centre and the democratic principles of socio-economic and ethnic equality are incorporated within state practices in order to attempt to meet their claims. The new state institutions have enshrined Weberian and neoliberal attributes of governance, combined with the local culture of informal governance based on clans and regional allegiances (Skendaj 2014) . They have been driven by compromises with geo-economic, regional, and local structural conditions, rather than emancipatory claims. This type of liberal statebuilding has not promoted equality and justice, but rather expanded the inequality gap and increased social discrimination. It has enhanced rather than replaced the oligarchical nature of politics. So far, any movement centred on the discourse of liberation and emancipation has ended up capturing power and reproducing old systems of power. Civil society, which is considered a pioneer of civic pluralism and social emancipation, has not been able to promote emancipatory politics in Kosovo due to their donor-driven conduct and detachment from communities. They have not managed to strengthen social trust within and between different communities in Kosovo. At best, they have tried to act as watchdogs over the government, and to some extent over donors and the EU.
Envisaging a More Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo
If transformation has historically been linked with Enlightenment rationalism, scientific discovery, various forms of elite domination, capitalism, as well as the improvement of rights pertaining to life, work, welfare, and sustainable economies and ecologies, with an approximation of material equality, this provides a clear direction for the evaluation of the existing 'peace' in Kosovo as well as its improvement. Indeed, much of this seems to be at the heart of Kosovan claims for a more emancipatory form of politics and peace: autonomy, respect for identity, legitimate authority, pluralism, representation, accommodation of the socio-economic needs of the population, as well as the historical and distributive justice claims of the different ethnic and minority communities.
As the existing ideologies and ethno-nationalist agendas in Kosovo are not conducive to emancipatory peace, there are other alternative local voices which seek to search for such a vision outside the present political order as well as beyond existing external blueprints for peace (as liberal or neoliberal forms of peace also appear to be inadequate), the state, and the economy. Building on the authors' long-term observation and consultation with local and international actors, we argue that the space for an emancipatory peace could emerge only in a conciliatory vision of peace and state between different internal and external forces, differently constituted rights and claims, and needs. This is not a utopian view of peace, or another interventionary framework. It is rather an attempt to outline an emancipatory framework of peace as non-domination rooted in local peace-enabling agency, drawing on the perspectives and approaches of local peace actors, and pointing to how international actors might facilitate this framework. It is a tentative sketch and alternative account of how a local emancipatory peace could emerge in Kosovo, as well as an attempt to operationalise further empirically post-liberal forms of peace.
In the remainder of this paper, we highlight some of the key aspects of an emancipatory peace in Kosovo. While we focus on exploring areas where transformation could take place, the micro-details of how such emancipatory change would materialise remains certainly in the domain of local practitioners and peacebuilders. We are not making here a prescriptive statement, rather an outline of outstanding and divisive issues which seem to be sources of tension, whose transformation could lead to a more sustainable peace. The nature of emancipatory justice would require justice for past crimes but also depoliticising and de-ethnicizing it in the future. Ethnic relations could recover only through a multi-layered dialogue making space for state and individuals to take individual and collective responsibility for past suffering and develop forward-looking conciliatory narratives. As the sociology of conflict is related to state formation in Kosovo, questions of sovereignty and statehood might be inevitable to enable self-governance, domestic and regional peace, and integration into the European Union and global society. To enable social emancipation, the nature of governance would need to promote local representation, popular consent, rather than authoritarian and external rule. This should go beyond the facades of local ownership that is often cooped by ethnic elites to include local peace infrastructure. Material constraints would inevitably require more external subvention (a structural issue that would need to be solved with more international enablement of locally legitimate authority and economic assistance).
The security apparatus would need to be reformed to put people's security before state security. Often, human security is made redundant when exploited by local elites for monoethnic security and external actors for stabilisation purposes. Finally, the economy would need to promote local production and provide welfare (requiring both protectionism and aid), while also remaining connected to the global economy in a positive manner. Such views tend to be propagated amongst a small group of commentators, activists, NGOs, and policymakers who reject national interest, ethno-nationalism, see the state's role mainly as delivering social justice and law, and think in terms of a more durable and sustainable form of peace. Bosniaks view peace more in relation to security and equality. 3 The US and European states relate peace to order, stability, and statebuilding, while non-western states perceive peace more in relation to non-interference, and peaceful resolution of disputes. So, prospects for a emancipatory peace in Kosovo require a mediation or conglomeration of these various conceptions. On this basis, the space for emancipatory peace would require developing a pluralist and civic identity beyond divisive ethno-nationalist politics, as well as alleviating structural violence and inequality by the majoritarian groups. 4 Local civil society groups can play a crucial role in promoting civic identity. The dominant international role needs to be replaced with other more facilitative forms of engagement that enable local agency to promote and sustain a positive and emancipatory peace. Yet at the same time, the risk of violence and various predatory forms of power require a firmer security role in the absence of a state able to achieve such goals.
To improve the quality of peace, the conciliatory nature of justice would require dealing with the past and accountability for war crimes not only through international and institutional mechanisms part of transitional justice, but also through community-based interaction, dialogue, and reconciliation. Key to emancipatory peace in Kosovo is a critical citizenry, which involves the personal transformation of the people living in post-conflict societies who question the existing ethno-nationalist, top-down, elite-driven, and externally-controlled politics (Visoka 2017 ). According to the evidence outlined above, they would aim at rejuvenating local democracy as well as egalitarian principles of equality, justice and fairness. These are generally found to be inadequate in both the current environment and in the model proposed by internationals according to this community. If a more emancipatory peace in Kosovo is to take root it should be centred on peoples' emancipation from the existing local political order, and a reform of the states in the region. It would also require, after a long-term presence of external actors, a departure for dependency on external forces. So, at the centre of a more emancipatory politics should be placed the development of a critical pedagogy for an active citizenry, which is directed towards a revised form of social contract, allied to global reforms to mitigate inequality and the negative effects of globalisation. This also entails the emergence of local civil society groups who are not primarily attuned to implementing external donor agendas, but are genuine local change-makers, promoter of local peace, and representatives of emancipatory virtues.
One key aspect of this critical pedagogy is to learn to act as a 'powerful citizen' Political representatives should not take their political authority for granted: instead they should see it as an obligation in service of the general population. To enable this shift in statesociety relations, a critical citizenship requires cultivating a culture of community activism, discussion of common problems with neighbours and finding ways of mobilizing the community in order to maintain such checks and balances.
From a local needs-based perspective, an everyday peace would look as follows: a safe and secure community, autonomous but yet integrated into regional and international order; basic functioning public services, accessible education, healthcare; and jobs to enable family security and development. While this is more conducive to mono-ethnic and stable communities, in mixed communities an everyday peace adds layers of good neighbourliness and conflict avoidance with members of other ethnic and religious communities (Mac Ginty 2014) . This would also mean changing the existing relations of labour forces, re-energizing trade unions, and empowering workers' rights. Cross-community cooperation would be possible only if the nationalist political discourse is transformed and a new discourse of common civic identity emerges in the light of the European integration process.
Conclusion
An important debate during the liberal peace era was over the nature of emancipation in a post-socialist world. One of the critical arguments about the liberal peace was that it had abandoned direct emancipation in its focus on security, institutions and law, bureaucracy, and economic development, thus also downgrading reconciliation and broad forms of justice as a goal of peacebuilding. From this perspective, the role of the state was to modernize and provide a level playing field in which citizens could transcend ethnic or religious difference. peace, the state, regional organizations, and the international system, the above discussion offers a picture of a hybrid of liberal peace, Kosovan politics, and regional relations, ideally reconfigured in order to provide citizens with the prospect of much improved lives, and the social, political, economic, and security in order to achieve a stable local and regional order.
This could be said to be a positive form of hybrid peace, as opposed to the current negative form. In reality, efforts to build a liberal peace in Kosovo have produced negative hybrid outcomes, partly geopolitical, partly liberal, partly oligarchic and nationalist. Both the international community and ethnic elites have created a flawed democracy and oligarchical capitalism with weak local legitimacy. The primacy of territorial stability and regional order has unintentionally suppressed the emergence of a new social contract that would promote an emancipatory peace, pluralist citizenry, and social justice. Ethnic power-sharing has entrenched nationalist groups and permitted the formation of an authoritarian culture, which has undermined reconciliation and contributes to the re-territorialisation of power and entrenched ethnic divisions. Oligarchical capitalism through a neo-liberal economic regime has brewed corruption, increased poverty and distorted social wellbeing. This negative hybrid peace and contested state is not capable of meetings its citizens' claims, nor capable of matching the requirements for European Union integration, or sufficiently supported to contribute to international society.
While an emancipatory impetus is traceable in certain local civil society initiatives, overcoming the contradictions of the hybrid social contract in Kosovo requires reconciling a divisive conception of state, and peace, and promoting a pluralist, locally generated civic identity. It would offer the power of attraction of future progress for all, meaning that it is widely supported by society and therefore can construct legitimate authority. This locally grounded emancipatory peace would require changing the character of the existing state in Kosovo. Ironically, failed statebuilding has provided some space for these approaches to crystallise in theory and civil society praxis, but in both they are still marginal when compared to elite power relations within the state, across the region, and when compared to the system of global governance embedded within Kosovo. However, even when local progressive actors have their way, they find (as they themselves point out) that a lack of consensus and stability in the understanding of peace at the international level, as well as a lack of political will, undermines their attempts to inculcate pluralism, liberalism, and social justice.
